On the Cause of Faith
Why do some believe the Gospel while others do not? And why does God reward faith and punish unbelief? Faustus Socinus’s brief discourse on this question, here complete in English translation.
This is an original translation by socinianism.com, made directly from the Latin specifically for this page. It is based on the text printed in the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, Fausti Socini Opera, vol. II, pp. 455–457. Socinus wrote the discourse in Italian; it survives in this Latin translation.
A Brief Discourse on the Cause Why the Gospel of Jesus Christ Is Believed or Not Believed; and on the Fact That God Rewards Him Who Believes and Punishes Him Who Does Not Believe. F. S.
Translated from the Italian into Latin.
In all his actions man has some good as his end. But the good is twofold. For on the one hand that is good which is just and agreeable to reason, without regard to any benefit that is to come back to the one who has to do it. And on the other hand that is good which brings some benefit to the one who does it. There is, therefore, no one who deliberately does anything which he does not consider either to be just and agreeable to reason, or certain to bring him some benefit.
It is true, indeed, that what is just and agreeable to reason bears fruit for the one who does it; but this is not known to men by nature. By nature they know only this: that what is just and agreeable to reason must by all means be done, even though it bears no fruit for the one who does it, and rather brings him harm; just as, on the other side, they by nature desire to reap some fruit from the things they do, or at least to suffer no harm. Hence it comes about that when a man is faced with something to do which seems to him just and agreeable to reason, but which (as it appears) will bring him harm, he is driven on the one side by reason to do it — for reason dictates to him by nature always to do what he deems just and agreeable to reason; on the other side, however, he is drawn to leave it undone by desire, which by nature moves him to avoid harm.
Now whoever in this struggle lets reason prevail is worthy of praise; for in order to do what he thought right, he chose rather to suffer, and bade farewell to his own innate desire. Whoever, on the contrary, lets appetite prevail is worthy of blame; since, in order to satisfy his desire, he did not restrain himself from doing what he himself judged ought not to be done.
But because that innate desire for benefit is all too powerful in us, it often happens that, unless we recognise or consider that doing what is just and agreeable to reason will bring us some benefit, we leave it undone, although otherwise we should very much like to do it; and that we do what is neither just nor agreeable to reason, although otherwise it displeases us, because we hope to reap some fruit from it — that is, honour, advantage, or pleasure.
When, therefore, God wished to bring it about that we should do what is just and agreeable to reason, and so to make us partakers of himself, who is the fountain of all justice and of all reason, it was not enough for him to instil into our minds from our very birth some knowledge of these things, or to set out perfectly before us in various ways what is truly just and agreeable to reason — in particular by giving the Law to his people by the hand of Moses, and above all by fully revealing his will through the mouth of Jesus Christ. But beyond this, besides the other means he used to accomplish the same end, he lastly brought it about in the person of Jesus Christ himself that we should have greater cause than ever before to judge that the doing of the things just mentioned will bear fruit for those who do them: he set eternal life as the reward for everyone who would carry them out, and he gave as a pledge Christ himself — whom we must strive to resemble if we wish to carry them out — raised from a wretched death to a blessed and immortal life.
This reward is not only supreme and incomparable, but also, above all other things, the most desired by everyone (for nothing do we seek more than happiness and life). Had it been set before us so plainly that no cause for doubt remained, there is no doubt that no man would be so hostile to the just and reasonable things we have spoken of that he would not become their friend — that is, that he would not carry them out in order to obtain such a reward.
For this reason God did indeed wish, by the promise of this reward, to relieve human frailty, so that those who in any case take pleasure in what is just and agreeable to reason, hearing such a promise, might be raised to the hope that their action will be of the greatest benefit to them, and might so do it. But he did not wish the matter to be carried so far by this that no difference would remain between the man who desires to do well and the one who is touched by no desire for it; rather, he willed that this should be the very means of distinguishing and recognising the one from the other. For just as the man who desires to do well, when he hears that there is talk of a reward set before him who does what is just and agreeable to reason, readily gives credence to such good news, and by giving it credence does the things spoken of, and in this way makes it plain that he is a man who desires to do well: so, on the contrary, the man who desires to do evil, when he hears talk of this reward, refuses to give credence and holds it up to ridicule; and consequently he does not bring himself to do the things spoken of, and so reveals himself to be one who has no heart for doing well. From this it follows that God, to his highest glory, appears just, and is a generous rewarder of the former but a stern avenger of the latter.
Therefore the all-wise God, among other things which do not allow human judgment to hold it as a most certain matter that whoever carries out what was commanded and done by Jesus of Nazareth, who is called Christ, will receive the reward, eternal life — God willed, I say, that Jesus himself, raised from the dead, should not be seen by the whole people, but only by some, whom God appointed as witnesses of that resurrection. For if the whole people had seen him, no one would have been so wicked that, having perceived in this way that Christ had spoken the truth and that the reward he spoke of is certain, he would not have joined himself to him and so would have appeared an upright man. But since each one heard only that this was asserted by those witnesses, and so had at least some cause to doubt whether it was true or not, he who delighted in doing evil and was, as it were, hardened in his wickedness gave no credence to such truth and testimony. Credence was given only by those who had previously failed to amend their lives for no other reason than that they did not yet see how they could hope, by doing well, to gain the fruits which they seemed to reap from doing evil; as soon as some light of hope in this shone upon them, they gladly forsook what was wrong and began to do well and to change their lives. The others, meanwhile, stuck fast in their sins: because of the immoderate pleasure which they drew from doing evil, or because they were too much enslaved to their desires, they refused to believe that it would turn out to their advantage if they changed their lives — unless, as the saying goes, a pledge were put into their hand.
Further: since the things which we ought to do, if we wish to follow Christ, are not only just and agreeable to reason but angelic and heavenly, and seem in large part to exceed man’s natural powers, it follows that it is not enough for a man (generally speaking) to have some opinion of the reward we have spoken of; rather, if he wishes to persevere to the end and to be steadfast in every temptation, he must have some certainty of it, which God in his kindness, by the power of his Spirit, makes us feel in our hearts. But this grace he bestows only on those who, when they hear talk of such a reward, assent that it may be true, so that they set themselves to forsake what is wrong and to obey the voice of the Gospel. To it they give that first faith which is necessary for doing this, and which, as we have said, arises from the mind not being averse to doing what is just and agreeable to reason. To these alone, then, if they persevere in this good purpose, God gives such light concerning the things promised and prepared for those who love him and obey his will revealed through Christ, that it suffices to strengthen them even in the most terrible struggle, and to equip them to overcome every difficulty, however grievous, that meets one who wishes to follow in the footsteps of Jesus Christ to the very end.
The others, however, who are held back by their wickedness or their sins — however much, hearing the preaching of the Gospel, they understand that it is just and agreeable to reason to obey such a voice — nevertheless refuse to obey it, because they do not see the certainty of the reward set before them, and do not resolve to change their lives. These, I say, not only never enjoy the gift of God we have spoken of, namely the sense of the truth of his most blessed promises, but besides, as the punishment due to their wickedness or negligence, they are wont, in addition to other penalties, sometimes to be deprived by him of their natural gifts, and, their understanding being in large part taken from them, to become like beasts. For if a man, as was said above, is worthy of blame for not doing what is just and agreeable to reason, even though it seems certain to him that harm will come upon him if he does it: how much more will he be worthy of blame, nay, of chastisement, if he does not do it at a time when he has cause to believe that his doing it will bring him infinite fruit.
A man, therefore, to whom the will of God brought to the world through Christ has been revealed ought to consider this: even if deeds committed against that will, and consequently neither just nor agreeable to reason, seem able to yield him some great fruit, in that they bring him honour, or advantage, or remarkable pleasure; and if, on the contrary, should he leave them aside and do what is just, agreeable to reason and conformable to that divine will, it may seem that he is to suffer grievous harm, by enduring disgrace, or the loss of his property, or no slight affliction of the body — nevertheless, on account of what he has heard told of Christ, raised from the dead and taken up into heaven, made immortal and most mighty, he has no slight cause to hope that for him who imitates Christ so great a gain is in the end set before him that it will most abundantly make up for, nay, infinitely surpass, every evil previously endured. Nor is there any doubt that, unless he is wholly a slave of sin and of carnal and worldly desires, he will resolve to obey that divine will; and so, escaping the most grievous punishment which God will inflict on the disobedient, he will be able henceforth, with God’s help, to continue in that obedience, and at last to carry off glory, riches, and joy unspeakable and everlasting.
About the text
The discourse is one of the short writings of Faustus Socinus. In the second volume of his works it stands between his reply to the objections of the minister Cuteni and his treatise against the Chiliasts; the running head of the print calls it simply “Brevis discursus F. S. de caussa fidei” — “A brief discourse by F. S. on the cause of faith”.
Socinus’s answer: God promised eternal life and guaranteed it by raising Christ, yet deliberately did not set it so openly before our eyes that no one could doubt any longer. The risen Christ appeared only to the witnesses, not to the whole people. Faith thus becomes the touchstone: whoever wishes to do good gives credence to the good news; whoever clings to evil ridicules it. The certainty needed to persevere is given by God through his Spirit to those who embrace this first faith and act on it.
The last, very long paragraph of the print has been divided into three for readability; otherwise the translation follows the arrangement of the original.
